






























































Journal of Legal Anthropology • Volume 4, Issue 2, Winter 2020: 1–16 © The Author(s)
doi:10.3167/jla.2020.040401 ISSN 1758-9576 (Print) • ISSN 1758-9584 (Online)
INTRODUCTION
tv
Legal responsibility in an 
entangled world
Julia Eckert and Laura Knöpfel
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Abstract: Responsibility and accountability in entangled global relations 
are negotiated across jurisdictional boundaries, localities and scales of 
legality. In this special issue, we trace struggles for corporate accountabil­
ity from extraction sites in Ecuador, Colombia and Peru to an abandoned 
asbestos factory in Italy. We enquire into the gap between the legal in­
stitutions which govern attributions of responsibility in procedural, tort 
and corporate laws, lived experiences of harm connected to transnational 
business activities and moral expectations of responsibility in global rela­
tions. In the struggles for justice discussed in this special issue, we detect 
potential ways of rethinking ascriptions of responsibility to reflect the 
deep entanglements of our economies.
Keywords: Legal responsibility, global capitalism, corporate accountabil­
ity, mobilisation of law, juridification
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Harm in the context of global capitalism is locally felt but trans­
national in the process of its production. In this special issue, we turn 
to  struggles for corporate accountability to trace possible means of at­
tributing responsibility in ways that reflect how global entanglements 
cross existing jurisdictional boundaries, transgress distinctions be­
tween legal fields and connect actors, places, and jurisdictions at dif­
ferent scales. We read these struggles as an expression of the disconnect 
between moral expectations and legal regulations within contempo­
rary global capitalism. We posit that established legal institutions do 
not adequately reflect how harm is produced in border-transcending 
networks of extraction, production, trade, and consumption, and they 
also do not pay heed to matters of power and capacity in these complex 
processes. Law partitions entangled global relations into national units 
determined by domestic corporate and contract law. While most states 
recognize and enforce foreign law for contracts and financial collateral 
(Pistor 2019: 7), laws that regulate responsibility do not travel well, and 
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are ‘cut’ by jurisdictional and temporal limitations. Such a partitioning 
of global economic relations into neat units of potential responsibil­
ity hampers a social legal imagining of global value chains as inte­
grated, border­transcending economic entities and social institutions 
(Sobel­Read 2014). Hence, James Ferguson once aptly asked ‘[h]ow to 
identify a unit of responsibility, in a fiendishly complex, multiply­ 
layered and decidedly trans­national apparatus of harm­production?’ 
(2012: 560). In short, the depth and breadth of global entanglements are 
beyond law’s conceptual grasp.
The mismatch between the structure of global production, harm 
and law culminates in an ‘organized irresponsibility’ that Ulrich Beck 
identified as one of the central features of today’s ‘global risk society’ 
(Beck 1999). Such organized irresponsibility is not a by­product of global 
value chains, but a central reason for their profitability. In fact, legal 
concepts and principles have enabled and reinforced processes of ‘dis­
embedding’ – regulatory, spatial, and temporal dislocation – economic 
relations from their societal contexts (Joerges and Falke 2011). Existing 
legal instruments, as Marilyn Strathern once put it, ‘cut’ through the 
extensive entanglements in which harms are produced.1 Regardless of 
whether we look at provisions of criminal or civil law, legal tools are 
employed in a manner that diverts the focus away from core issues of 
corporate capitalism. By concentrating attention on individual injuries, 
existing instruments leave unaddressed the regulations that provide 
for the structural conditions of possibility of such injuries – such as 
investment and tax regimes. Moreover, they rely on concepts of respon­
sibility that privilege notions of immediate causation and intent, which 
are inadequate to tackle the complex chains of distributed agency, in 
which harms are produced and the distribution of capacities that could 
remedy both the production of harm and the effective harms. These 
are the ‘legal black holes’ (Mann 2018) that current legal institutions 
leave us to grapple with, where injuries, damages, and losses have no 
response in law, and the people harmed are left without any means 
of remedy.
These legal black holes of responsibility, we contend, are challenged 
by the mobilization of law ‘from below’ when people apply existing 
legal norms to their situations to claim an effective attribution of re­
sponsibility to those who would have the capacity to do otherwise. 
Struggles around corporate responsibility challenge legal fictions of 
international and national law such as the sovereign nation state, the 
separate corporate person, and freedom of contract, since these fictions 
bear little resemblance to the ‘assemblages’ (Ong and Collier 2005) that 
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create our global entanglements. Such struggles call for a reconfigura­
tion of relations between the various actors participating in the value 
chains of global capitalism and a (re)location of responsibility where 
the capacity for change, and the reasons and ‘root causes’ (Marks 2011) 
of harmful activities lie.2 We are interested in the shifts that struggles 
through law can engender in the ‘cuts’ liberal law creates in deeply 
entangled circumstances – the techniques, processes and reasonings by 
means of which moral ideas about the responsibilities of corporations, 
governments, and other actors participating in entangled relations, and 
particularly in the commodity chains that span the globe, become or are 
turned into legal understandings.
The contributions to this special issue thus explore how people 
experiencing harm related to the activities of multinational corpora­
tions struggle to define the kinds of responsibilities that are at stake in 
the entangled situations they face, and how they strive for justice. We 
examine how local struggles for corporate responsibility relate to the 
existing regulatory answers in national and international law and how 
the available legal tools shape aspirations and disappointments. We 
particularly observe how these struggles often call into question extant 
legal institutions in the very act of employing them. What is at issue is 
how, against a background of changing perceptions of global entangle­
ment, moral understandings of responsibility enter into struggles about 
legal responsibility in places where international investments are made, 
challenging jurisdictional boundaries and the spatio­temporal order 
within which responsibility is legally conceptualized.
Three questions stand at the centre of the articles collected in this 
special issue. First, how do reflections on our entanglements in global 
relations alter narratives about retrospective and prospective, moral 
and legal responsibilities and transgress the existing limits of laws of 
tort and contractual liability and the criminal responsibility of corpora­
tions and states? The contributors here consider which actors are given 
prime responsibility and what new conundrums ensue from shifts in 
claims of responsibility away from states towards corporations. Second, 
what promises of justice inhere in the different legal instruments used 
in juridification processes, and in the use of law in general, and how 
do these shape expectations, hopes and disappointments? Third, what 
specific limits do the various legal instruments that are introduced 
to regulate corporate responsibility impose on what can be named as 
an injury? Does juridification engender a depoliticization where that 
which can be addressed is reduced to available legal instruments, while 
other forms of suffering and even the structural possibilities of harm 
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are lost from view? Or is it part of the re­politicization of the global 
economy?
The contributions to this issue cover various jurisdictions, includ­
ing Italy, England, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia, and, more importantly, 
they are concerned with different legal fields and moments in time at 
which law becomes relevant to communities, activists, and corpora­
tions. The articles address how the institutions of civil liability, criminal 
liability, and the state’s duty to protect are mobilized in these struggles 
for justice, thereby shedding light on a range of opportunities for and 
limits on the ability of criminal, civil, and public law to ascribe respon­
sibility and deal with the spatial and temporal dimensions of harm.
Mobilizing law for global justice
The past two decades have seen much regulatory activity in national 
parliaments and courts, at the EU and UN and within other inter­
national organizations (Nolan and Baumann­Pauly 2016; Palombo 2020; 
Rodríquez­Garavito 2017; Ruggie 2007, 2013).3 Transnational advocacy 
networks of local and international NGOs have explored the possibil­
ities and limits of domestic tort, criminal and human rights laws in 
transnational lawsuits against parent corporations for the conduct of 
their subsidiaries and affiliates (see also Lindt this issue; for an over­
view of the lawsuits in Europe, see Marx et al. 2019).4 Civil society or­
ganizations and NGOs have pressed for legislative changes in home 
state jurisdictions, to ensure, for example, that corporations are subject 
to human rights due diligence obligations (Burgos 2012). International 
organizations have developed guidelines and frameworks to clarify 
and govern the relationship between business and human rights, the 
most significant of which are the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011.5 
The emerging regulatory field, which encompasses legal institutions of 
responsibility and accountability ranging from tort and contract law to 
customary international human rights law, is a hybrid conglomeration 
of private codes of conduct and national and international laws and 
regulations.
The belief in the potential of law to bring about change persists de­
spite all evidence that the ‘root causes’ (Marks 2011) of harm are left un­
affected. Indeed, many of the attempts to hold corporations accountable 
for harms that occur in relation to their economic activities raise hopes 
and expectations they do not fulfil. The majority of transnational suits 
5
lEgal rEsponsibility in an EntanglEd world tv
against parent corporations for harms along their supply chains have 
not been decided on the merits. They have either stumbled at jurisdic­
tional hurdles or ended in out­of­court settlements. There are various 
reasons for this, foremost among them the many obstacles that stand 
in the way of plaintiffs successfully suing multinational corporations, 
ranging from access to courts to information and financial resources 
to jurisdictional boundaries to the corporate veil, as a large body of 
research has shown (Marx et al. 2019; Skinner et al. 2013; Zerk 2014;). 
The turn to law has been judged futile and even de­politicizing ‘legal 
fetishism’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003), affirming the political order 
that underlies harm.
Yet in situations where ‘politics proper’ does not succeed, when 
demonstrations are put down with violence, as in the case described by 
Angela Lindt in this issue, or when far­reaching agreements between 
governments and corporations are concluded in the absence of dem­
ocratic controls, in short, when the odds are stacked too high against 
those without financial means or political clout, law might nonetheless 
turn out to be the only means available. It might be a weak tool, and it 
might fail. However, as Stuart Kirsch holds, the threat of litigation is 
‘one of the few sources of regulatory power available in a neoliberal 
world order’ (Kirsch 2014: 85). The mobilization of law thus appears 
as a means of doing politics, rather than in opposition to it. Inasmuch 
as these struggles for law strive to formulate and even establish other 
laws, to shift the prevailing cuts made by liberal law and to transform 
institutions to better reflect the relations that shape our current world, 
they might also re­politicize realms of interaction that have been de­po­
liticized by current economic ideologies.
The mobilizations of law to address the harms and damages suf­
fered as a consequence of the economic activities of multinational cor­
porations that we observe seek justice and prevention; these are the 
two concerns that those engaged in fighting against harmful activities 
of multinational corporations express. What inspires these mobiliza­
tions of law is the hope of finding effective remedy. This requires two 
things: the appropriate allocation of responsibility to those who are the 
reason for (rather than merely the cause of) harms, and who have the 
capacity to change the way things are done. Those who are affected by 
corporate harm do not perceive those who immediately commit an act 
of harm to bear sole responsibility for remedying the situation. They 
look as well to those on behalf of whose interests and for whose ben­
efit the harms are committed. It is their hope, however faint, that the 
law could provide the means to hold globally operating corporations 
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accountable for some of the harmful effects of their operations, where 
other means are not available; it is a hope that the law might balance 
the extreme asymmetries between such corporations and the people 
affected adversely by their activities. It is thus a belief in law’s promise 
of equalizing unequal power relations that inspires the ‘juridification 
of protest’ (Eckert et al. 2012) that we observe and the belief in law’s 
promise of justice (Lemaitre 2007).
For many plaintiffs, justice is closely connected to the attribution of 
‘guilt’. This becomes particularly evident in the articles by Angela Lindt 
and David Loher. However, the settlements that often replace trials in 
transnational litigation concerning corporate responsibility often do 
not bring about a judgement and thus do not state where fault lies. 
Lindt and Loher both show how out­of­court settlements individualize 
damage and fault. The individualization occurs with regard to the per­
petrator as well as the victim, singling out specific, individual ‘units of 
responsibility’ as well as ‘units of suffering’ according to the available 
legal instruments, which, for functional reasons, have a narrow concep­
tion of both perpetrator and victim. In the case studied by Lindt, the 
compensation payments made to individual claimants under the settle­
ment led to disputes and social tensions within the affected communi­
ties about the distribution of this money. By focussing on individual 
remedies, attention is also distracted from the complex causes of harm. 
Lindt discusses how disappointment with transnational lawsuits led 
victims to return to local and national legal avenues. Here we see how 
conceptions of responsibility are influenced by the legal process itself, 
as the focus on the individual local perpetrators of harm drew attention 
away from the corporate centre of the global value chain. Thus, the 
fragmentation of the value chain established by law and the immediate 
experience of injury converged when the entangled processes that gen­
erate harm were not reflected in accessible legal institutions. Resulting 
from the simplifications and hurdles inherent in legal processes, the 
corporation and corporate harm came to be conceived as more local 
than multinational or transnational.
What people expressly desired in the cases that Lindt describes was 
a public declaration of wrongdoing, as would be entailed in the judge­
ment of a court, a public statement of who was at fault and therefore 
responsible. Since the absence of a judgement attributing fault also fore­
stalls the creation of precedent, the two issues central to the plaintiffs’ 
hopes in litigation – justice and the prevention of future harm – remain 
unachieved.
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As David Loher discusses, law abstracts not only from the spatial 
dimension of corporate harm production but also from their tempo­
ral dimension. In transnational lawsuits and regulatory developments 
targeting harms that result from business activities, the most common 
forms of temporal dimensions of law are forfeiture and limitation peri­
ods. Both these legal timeframes are recurring features in transnational 
lawsuits against corporations.6 In the criminal lawsuit against the Swiss 
proprietor of the parent corporation of an asbestos processing factory in 
northern Italy, Loher describes how the temporality imposed on a harm 
by a statute of limitations clashes both with the temporality of the sub­
stance, asbestos, and its lasting injuriousness, and with the perception 
of those still suffering the effects of the industrial activities years after 
their cessation. From the perspective of the law, the harmful activities 
came to an end with the closure of the factory. For the local residents, 
however, the harm is continuous and will continue into the foreseeable 
future. The timeframe of the injury, of suffering and of fearful anticipa­
tion of future harm, does not fit into the ‘time-maps’ (Gell 1992) of law.
Loher’s interlocutors explicitly address the utterly unequal distri­
bution of costs and profits: ‘He made a fortune. And we should pay 
the price. Until today.’ Responsibility here was demanded from those 
whose causative role in the harms suffered was under dispute, but who 
were nonetheless seen as the main beneficiaries of the activities that 
caused these harms. The responsibility of those perceived as benefitting 
from harmful activities was also considered to last as long as the effects 
of these activities were suffered.
These cases demonstrate the many obstacles legal suits must over­
come to reach adjudication. When they – for whatever reason – move 
to the private forums of out­of­court settlements, they fail to attribute 
fault and establish who bears responsibility and they do not publicly 
affirm the norms violated by the events that caused harm. The aware­
ness among affected people of the complex webs of actors that produce 
the harms that make them suffer leads them to engage in ‘legal reason­
ing’ that recalibrates the relations among causation, capacity, intent, 
command and profit for the attribution of responsibility. They seek 
to hold responsible to a greater degree those on whose behalf and to 
whose benefit activities that cause harm are undertaken. What we see in 
these lay reasonings are conceptions of responsibility that, while partial 
to the needs and sufferings of those concerned, take into account the 
relations of power, the acts and motives that drive capitalism. In that 
regard, they are more appropriate to the situations they experience than 
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are the available legal instruments, which is why the latter often leave 
the affected people dissatisfied and disappointed.
Shifting attention from the law and transnational lawsuits to 
the subject of responsibility, the corporation as such, Laura Knöpfel 
identifies the potential of legal temporality to act as one of the ‘cut­
ting devices’ of liberal law regarding relations between society and 
business. In her case, the temporality of law that regulates a business 
activity serves to reject ascriptions of responsibility in the present. The 
time­binding function of law thus concerns past injuries or obligations 
in the present, and is also relevant with regard to future, not yet materi­
alized harms: The mining corporation in Knöpfel’s example refers to the 
risks associated with the future closure as a means of fulfilling its pres­
ent needs. A ‘not­yet risk’, such as high unemployment following the 
‘not­yet’ closures of mines, becomes a means to distract from current 
demands for employment opportunities. She discusses how corporate 
managers turn their representation of time, time as closure, into a gov­
ernance technique to navigate attributions of the responsibility of care. 
She enquires into the role of law in the strategic representation of time 
and asks how different legal orders of the multinational enterprise at a 
global resource frontier map onto that representation of time as closure.
This highlights how struggles around the harmful effects of the 
economic activities of multinational corporations can address only a 
specific range of harms and leave unaddressed issues such as poverty, 
the fear of unemployment and the loss of livelihood that Knöpfel’s in­
terlocutors express. They thus necessarily jar with the ambiguous re­
lations that many people have with multinational corporations, which 
simultaneously encompass dependence, benefits and injuries. What 
becomes evident here is how responsibilities are complex in them­
selves and entail not only obligations to ‘do no harm’ but also broader 
responsibilities of care that arise from the asymmetric relations of inter­
dependence between corporations and societies.
Complicit states
In transnational lawsuits and legislative regulatory developments re­
garding corporate responsibility in global economic relations, form, 
role, and responsibility of today’s modern corporation are scrutinised, 
negotiated, and newly defined. At stake is the nature of the corporation, 
and thus an unsettled matter that has become an object of research for 
anthropologists. In 2010, the anthropologists Peter Benson and Stuart 
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Kirsch complained that ‘anthropologists pay more attention to the state 
and governmentality than to how corporations shape the world in ac­
cordance with their pursuit of profit, growth and legitimacy’ (Benson 
and Kirsch 2010: 459). Since then, anthropologists have begun increas­
ingly to explore ‘corporate lives’ and their role in the making of the con­
temporary world (Foster 2017; Li 2015; Rajak 2011; Welker 2014; Welker 
et al. 2011).
However, if we focus solely on corporations as the prime actors in 
these relations, we render invisible the fact that they are, to some degree, 
state­created entities. Even though corporations are now involved in 
drafting law (see, e.g., Mugler 2019) and international organizations 
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Mon­
etary Fund (IMF) – in which only some states have an effective say – 
have developed their very own norm­generating formats, we would 
do well to take into account how states participate in the making of 
global capitalism. Formally, it is states that make the laws that regu­
late the global economy and give corporations their legal shape (Pistor 
2019). It is, moreover, governments that choose which laws to enact how 
and when, even if some states are severely restricted in their choices of 
whether or not to ratify international agreements on legal forms. The 
fact that states differ in terms of their autonomy towards international 
treaties and agreements, as well as towards the legal strategies of corpo­
rations, should not deflect from the governmental decisions that create 
the specific relations between places, those who inhabit these places, 
and corporations. This is what Shalini Randeria (2003) meant by the 
‘cunning state’: the state that capitalizes on its perceived weakness in 
order to avoid responsibility. The more states present themselves as 
weak, the more attention is focused on corporations.7
We see the importance of the role of the state regarding corporate 
responsibility and accountability reflected in the legal consciousness 
of the people affected by corporate activities. In her contribution to this 
issue, Laura Affolter follows the lawsuits brought against the Ecuado­
rian state for granting mining concessions to foreign investors. These 
claims are not directed against one individual mining corporation and 
do not seek remedy for a specific harm. Rather, they call into question 
the whole economic policy of the government of Ecuador. The constitu­
tional action that Affolter explores aims at a structural change towards 
a regime in which investment and tax decisions would be guided by 
concerns for the liveability enshrined in the constitutional principle of 
buen vivir. Constitutional remedies bring together the spheres of politics 
and the economy and provide the means to address potential future 
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‘root causes’ of harms. At stake in the case that Affolter discusses is 
thus not only the legal structure, but also the political and economic 
structures in which corporations are embedded.
Taken together, the articles in this special issue point to the political 
acts that enable specific practices and relations of production, trade, 
and consumption while disabling others. Since neither corporations nor 
any single state or international organization creates these structures 
of possibility independently and since there is not even any clear divi­
sion of labour, the locations of responsibility are increasingly complex 
webs of entangled actors at different scales, encompassing corporations, 
legislatures, governments, and consumers. Considering all these var­
ious participants in the making of situations of injury and suffering 
foregrounds the political economy of harms. Legal and political acts, 
economic structures and corporate conduct condition and constitute 
each other.
Towards new responsibilities
In the struggles for justice discussed here, we detect potential ways of 
rethinking ascriptions of responsibility to reflect the deep entangle­
ments of our current world. These entanglements engender inextricable 
‘communities of responsibility’ (Eckert 2016) formed by our participa­
tion in the long chains of distributed action constituted by global cap­
italism. Those engaged in struggles are aware that diverse connected 
deeds cause suffering, and they claim that those who could have but 
did not prevent a case of harm should also be held responsible and 
liable. They renegotiate what today in law is called mediate responsi­
bility: actions and omissions that enable (rather than physically cause) 
situations of damage and hurt. These are moving closer to the centre 
of claims (Eckert 2019). They also put a new focus on those that benefit 
from harmful activities, whether intentionally or not.8 Their benefits, 
as the ultimate end of the economic activities that generate harm, are 
re­conceptualized as primary ‘causes’ of harm. By moving actors and 
activities that enable and benefit from corporate harm to the fore, the 
legal institution of causation in criminal and civil law becomes second­
ary to determine attributions of responsibility and liability.
Current legal instruments also contain principles that make omis­
sions, failure to provide assistance, and forms of mediate responsibility 
such as aiding and abetting, or complicity (hovering between direct and 
indirect responsibility) punishable. However, the distinction between 
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mediate and immediate responsibility, that is, the specific narration of 
causation implicit in these terms, does not correspond to the processes 
that constitute factual entanglement and harm in global entanglements; 
the distinction reproduces the divisions among primary and secondary 
causative actions set by jurisdictions. Moreover, aside from problems 
associated with jurisdictional borders and separate corporate personal­
ities, the inability of current legal instruments to grapple with respon­
sibility for harms that occur in global value chains lies in the weight 
they give to immediate cause, intent, and the capacity to effect change, 
which Bernard Williams (1993) called ‘response’. Reconceiving respon­
sibility as a matter of ‘complex networked associations’, as Manzurual 
Hassan, Peter Atkins, and Christine Dunn (2006: 280) have proposed, 
challenges us to reconsider the links between legal norms of respon­
sibility, notions of causation and issues such as capacity (to change), 
intent, and response inherent in concepts of responsibility, and consider 
each in a more relational manner, weighing capacity and intent within 
these entanglements in a way that reflects the different capabilities of 
all participants ‘to act otherwise’.9
We see suggestions of this in the claims people make on differ­
ent actors: The claims to obligations of care made by Laura Knöpfel’s 
inter locutors; the insistence of the people David Loher encountered 
that those who profit bear responsibility whether or not they are the 
immediate cause of harm and that they bear responsibility as long as 
the in juries caused by the activities that they benefitted from continue 
to occur; the claims to prospective responsibility of state agents in the 
struggles Laura Affolter describes, prospective responsibility for not 
only the prevention of individual harms but more generally for safe­
guarding the possibility of living well (buen vivir) for humans and 
non­human nature alike; and, last but not least, the insistence of the 
communities in Angela Lindt’s cases that justice is a public issue, not 
to be individually dispersed in private settlement agreements. These 
instances of lay ‘legal reasoning’ suggest ways of attributing respon­
sibility that may more appropriately reflect the relations of power that 
shape our current world.10
The ways our interlocutors imagine and articulate corporate re­
sponsibility entail suggestions about the question raised by James Fer­
guson about how a unit of responsibility can be identified in entangled, 
global relations. These struggles, legal and at the same time profoundly 
political, call us to enquire further how institutions of graduated li­
ability that neither diffuse responsibility entirely into vague notions 
of political or ethical responsibility nor abandon limits to (individual, 
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corporate, and collective) legal responsibility could be established. 
How could the ‘bottom up’ perspectives on corporate responsibility 
that we have found in our empirical enquiries into the relations be­
tween business and society at resource frontiers as well as in the dis­
tinct lawsuits against corporations and states for transnational harms 
to people and the environment alter and adapt legal concepts such as 
causation, separate corporate personality, and limited liability to reflect 
more adequately the economic, political, and social reality of transna­
tional business relations? In particular, how might we legally grasp the 
acts and omissions that enable and the actors that benefit from trans­
national apparatuses of harm production? And finally, how might we 
think about causation if we were to foreground the capacity of actors 
to prevent systems of harm to emerge, or at least to ameliorate them, 
and to remedy losses and injuries? Would this take into account, in 
establishing obligations of care and remedy, the benefits that accrue to 
some – and some more so than others – from harmful activities? These 
are the questions that arise from this special issue’s studies of struggles 
for legal, moral and political corporate responsibility.
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1. In response to Bruno Latour’s thesis on the extension of the chains of action 
in the modern age, Marilyn Strathern held that while modern networks or action 
chains have possibly become more far­reaching, modern institutions, such as 
modern law, cut short these networks at intervals briefer than many traditional 
norms.
2. In the following, we use the concept of the ‘global value chain’ to describe 
border­transcending economic processes structured by equity or contract. The 
concept of the global value chain is to be situated in the notion of the ‘commodity 
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chain’ that Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein developed in the course of 
their world­systems research in the 1970s and 1980s (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1977, 
1982) to describe the integration of production ‘on a world scale’. They described the 
multinational corporation as ‘an accumulating production unit’ transferring capital 
from the periphery to the core (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982: 79–80) in a process 
of ‘world accumulation’. Whereas the concept of the commodity chains seeks to de­
scribe the macro dynamics in the world system, the notion of the global value chain 
centres on the governance of the relations and processes between linked firms (Bair 
2008). Global value chains describe the value-adding processes that involve differ­
ent firms and the entirety of activities required to conceive, extract, manufacture, 
sell, trade, consume, and recycle a product (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 2016). Of 
course, the notion of ‘value’ is highly problematic, since it is based on a limited 
notion of value understood in purely monetary and financial terms (Gradin 2016). 
This is especially problematic with regard to natural resources. Natural resources 
only appear in official national accounts after they have been exploited commer­
cially. As Thomas Piketty argues, this distorts the real growth of national income 
or GDP since extraction ‘depletes existing reserves while contributing to air pollu­
tion and global warming, neither of which is reflected in official national accounts’ 
(Piketty 2020: 612).
3. The UN Global Compact, established and launched by UN Secretary­ 
General Kofi Annan in 2000, marks the beginning of decentralized, multilevel, and 
normatively plural governance of corporate social responsibility. To date, the UN 
Global Compact is the world’s largest voluntary initiative, bringing together over 
13,000 corporations. It comprises ten principles in the areas of human rights, labour 
rights, and the environment. However, it should be noted that efforts to establish 
an international regulatory framework to govern the activities of multinational 
corporations go back to the 1970s. While an UN initiative to develop binding rules 
was unsuccessful and formally abandoned in 1992, the Organisation for Economic 
Co­operation and Development adopted a set of Guidelines for Multinational Enter­
prises in 1976, and the International Labour Organization followed a year later with 
the adoption of a Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises. Both regulatory frameworks make reference to the Universal Declara­
tion of Human Rights, and the OECD Guidelines have since incorporated the UN 
Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights. Since the end of the 1990s, the 
pace of regulatory action has accelerated in an unprecedented manner.
4. The majority of lawsuits have been filed under the usual rules of tort law and 
the law of delicts with the claim that the parent corporation has either a direct duty 
of care or is vicariously liable for damages resulting from human rights violations 
and environmental pollution linked to its business activities.
5. The UN Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights speak of busi­
nesses’ responsibility to respect human rights and introduce the idea of human 
rights due diligence. They represent a turning point in the governance of busi­
nesses’ transnational responsibilities. Having called on nation states to regulate 
the conduct of ‘their’ corporations, various governments have adopted or are in 
the process of developing laws that take up the idea of human rights due diligence. 
In particular, the French law on the duty of vigilance, the EU Directive on the 
reporting on non-financial information and the Dutch child labour law should be 
mentioned.
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6. In transnational lawsuits, these statutes of limitation are exacerbated in their 
effect by the time it takes for claims to travel from the periphery to the core of global 
value chains. To say it in the simplest way possible: the preparation of a transna­
tional lawsuit requires a lot of time and therefore always risks being time­barred 
before a first-instance judgement is achieved.
7. As is evident in Laura Knöpfel’s article, it is not only states but also corpora­
tions that engage in ‘acts of cunning’ in order to render themselves unaccountable. 
We need to recognize misrepresentations of weakness and move beyond state or 
corporate self­descriptions of their positionality within global entanglements.
8. Iris Marion Young already questioned the adequacy of liability models that 
rely on direct relations of cause and effect. She found them unsatisfactory and 
pointed to the obligations of those involved in the broader chain of events in which 
harms are produced, even when they are pursuing goals and interests within given 
institutional rules and accepted norms (2011). Even earlier, Judith Shklar (1990) put 
forth the suggestion that responsibility can do without the concept of the moral 
agent or the autonomous individual and focus instead on the capacity to mitigate 
suffering.
9. For the ability to act otherwise as a pre­condition of bearing responsibility, 
see for example, Laidlaw 2014.
10. We take inspiration here from Maksymilian del Mar, who argues that legal 
reasoning provides new possibilities of interpretation ‘hinting at the possibility, 
perhaps even desirability . . . of introducing, more explicitly, a new rule in the 
future’ (Mar 2017: 51).
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